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THE HEALTH CARE CASES
AND THE NEW MEANING OF
COMMANDEERING*
BRADLEY W. JOONDEPH"

The Supreme Court's decision in the Health Care Cases to
sustain the central provisions of the Affordable Care Act
("ACA") was hugely important in several ways. Most
commentators have focused on the Court's upholding of the
ACA's minimum coverage provision. But the Court's Medicaid
holding-that the ACA coerced (and thus commandeered) the
states by making their preexisting Medicaidfunds contingent on
the states expanding their programs-may actually be more
significantas a matter of constitutionallaw.
The thesis of this Article is that, in finding the ACA's Medicaid
expansion provisions coercive, the Court has re-conceptualized
what constitutes a federal "command" to the states, and thus redefined the scope of the anti-commandeering principle. The
Court's holding means that federal laws can constitute
commands even when they do not legally compel the states to act.
The relevant inquiry is now practical rather than formal: has
Congress left the states with a "real option" of saying no to the
federal government's conditions? This is an important shift. Not
only does it potentially jeopardize a range of federal spending
programs, but it also affects laws operating on the states as
"conditional prohibitions"-federal statutes conditionally
preempting state law. Until now, such statutes have been
consideredfully consistent with the anti-commandeeringdoctrine
because they do not formally require the states to act. But the
Health Care Cases upend this understanding.If, as a practical
matter, the states have no "genuine choice" but to govern on a
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particular subject, Congress's conditions specifying how that
subject must be governed (to avoidfederal preemption) may well
amount to unconstitutionalcommandeerings.
This new understanding could be particularly troubling in the
field of state and local taxation. The number, complexity, and
heterogeneity of state and local tax systems almost certainly
impose a number of unnecessary costs on the American
economy. And as the Court itself has long recognized, Congress
is much better suited institutionally than the judiciary to address
these problems. An anti-commandeering doctrine that
disempowers Congress from enacting laws that meaningfully
regulatestate taxation would be unfortunate.
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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's decision in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius' (better known as the "Health Care
Cases") is easily the most important the Court has handed down since
John Roberts became Chief Justice in 2005, and it may prove one of
the most significant in the Court's history. In upholding the central
provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
("ACA"), the Court effectively ratified the most important federal
statute in two generations. 2 Assuming it is fully implemented, the
ACA could transform the delivery and financing of health care in the
United States, a sector comprising nearly one-fifth of the American
economy. Further, once the Act goes into full effect, it will make
access to health coverage for all Americans-regardless of income,
health, or job status-a permanent component of our basic social
contract.' As such, the ACA may soon become a fixed stone in our
constitutional foundation-something akin to Social Security,
Medicare, or the Civil Rights Act of 1964-with which all viable
political movements (and constitutional theories) will need to come
to terms.
1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
2. See Jack M. Balkin, The Court Affirms Our Social Contract,THE ATLANTIC (June
29, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/the-court-affirms6
our-social-contract/25918 / ("The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
made the most significant change to the American social contract since the Great Society
programs of the 1960s.").
3. See, e.g., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., THE FUTURE OF NURSING:
LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING HEALTH 2 (2011) ("The ACA represents the broadest
changes to the health care system since the 1965 creation of the Medicare and Medicaid
programs and is expected to provide insurance coverage for an additional 32 million
previously uninsured Americans."); David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the
Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are Needed to Prevent
Avoidable Costs for Low and Moderate Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669, 669-70
(2012) ("[Tihe ACA is the most extensive reform to the U.S. healthcare system since the
creation of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965.").
4. See Ronald Dworkin, A Bigger Victory Than We Knew, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug.
16, 2012, at 6, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/aug/16/biggervictory-we-knew; Joey Fishkin, A Massive Victory for Liberalism, BALKINIZATION (June
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/06/massive-victory-forAM),
3:40
2012,
29,
liberalism.html.
5. See Barry Friedman, Obamacare and the Court: Handing Health Policy Back to
the People, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2012, at 87, 97 ("If ... Obama wins a second term,
then the health-care law will likely become entrenched alongside long-standing social
welfare programs such as Social Security and Medicare."); Balkin, supra note 2; Fishkin,
supra note 4; cf Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1742
(2007) (describing the phenomenon by which certain "landmark statutes" become quasiconstitutional in nature, in that they shape interpretations of the Constitution as much as
the text itself).
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Most commentary has focused on that part of the decision
sustaining the ACA's minimum coverage provision (or "individual
mandate") as a valid exercise of Congress's taxing power.' But there
was another important question presented, one that may actually
have been more significant as a matter of constitutional law: whether
the ACA's substantial expansion of the Medicaid program was within
Congress's spending power.
Medicaid is the joint federal-state spending program that
provides health insurance to the indigent and the disabled. A state's
participation in the program is voluntary, but once a state opts in, it
must adhere to various federal statutory and administrative
regulations.' The ACA adds to these regulations-most notably, by
requiring states, beginning in 2014, to extend coverage to all adults
under the age of sixty-five with incomes up to 133% of the federal
poverty level.' The federal government will fund most of this
coverage expansion, but not all of it.' Thus, the ACA increases the
minimum cost to a participating state, and by a considerable amount.
The twenty-six state plaintiffs claimed that, by making the states'
preexisting Medicaid funding contingent on their willingness to
expand their Medicaid programs, the ACA's conditions are coercive,
and hence a "commandeering"-an unconstitutional command to the
states to govern according to Congress's direction."o In the Health

6. See, e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, Understanding the Failure of Health-Care
Exceptionalism in the Supreme Court's Obamacare Decision (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub.
Law Research Paper No. 12-37, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2109396;
Robin West, Justice Roberts' America (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Pub. Law and Legal
Theory Research Paper No. 12-112, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2120523;
Balkin, supra note 2; Richard A. Epstein, Taxation and Regulation Under the Health Care
Act, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2012, 12:05 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/
taxation-and-regulation-under-the-health-care-act/; Fishkin, supra note 4; Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Power to Destroy, PUB. DISCOURSE (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.
thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/08/6096; Ilya Shapiro, We Won Everything but the Case,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2012, 9:38 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/we-woneverything-but-the-caseL.
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980).
8. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 2001(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 271 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006 & Supp. 2010));
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1004, 124 Stat.
1029, 1034-36 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006 & Supp. 2010)).
9. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1201,
124 Stat. 1029,1051 (2010).
10. See Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid at 24-53, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400).
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Care Cases, seven Justices agreed." Chief Justice Roberts's
controlling opinion explained that, to be sure, Congress could require
the states to adhere to the ACA's conditions in order to qualify for
the ACA's new funding for Medicaid expansion.12 But Congress
could not require the states to participate in the ACA's "new
program" on pain of losing their funding for the existing, pre-ACA
Medicaid program-a program the Justices characterized as separate
and distinct.13 Threatening states with the loss of their existing
Medicaid funding streams-funds constituting, on average, more than
ten percent of a state's annual budget-"is much more than 'relatively
mild encouragement'-it is a gun to the head."' 4 Because the Act
offered the states no "genuine choice"i or "real option"'" other than
to implement the ACA's Medicaid expansion, reasoned the Chief
Justice, it " 'require[d] the States to govern according to Congress'
instructions,' " violating the structural principles of federalism.'
The thesis of this Article is that, in finding the ACA's Medicaid
expansion provisions coercive, the Court has effectively reconceptualized what constitutes a federal command to the states, and
consequently re-defined the scope of the anti-commandeering
principle. Previously, the Court had invalidated federal statutes as
commandeerings only when those statutes formally compelled the
states to govern in a particular fashion.' 8 But an implicit premise of
the Health Care Cases is that federal laws can constitute commands
even when they do not legally require the states to act. The relevant
inquiry is now practicalrather than formal. What matters is whether
Congress has left the states with a "real option" of saying no to the
federal government's conditions.
This is an important shift. As many commentators have
recognized, the Court's decision potentially jeopardizes a range of

11. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2601-08 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined
by Breyer and Kagan, JJ.); id. at 2656-68 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.,
dissenting).
12. Id. at 2607 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) ("Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress
from offering funds under the Affordable Care Act to expand the availability of health
care, and requiring that States accepting such funds comply with the conditions on their
use.").
13. Id.

14. Id. at 2604 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,211 (1987)).
15. Id. at 2607.
16. Id. at 2605.

17. Id. at 2602 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,162 (1992)).
18. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York, 505 U.S. at
174-77.
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federal spending programs." If the relevant federal enticements leave
the states with no practical choice but to conform to Congress's
instructions-as in the case of the ACA's Medicaid provisions-the
conditions attached to that largesse must now be seen as commands.
But the implications go further, beyond the scope of spending
legislation. This new meaning of commandeering also affects federal
laws operating on the states as conditional prohibitions-statutes that
conditionally preempt state law. Such statutes are quite common in
the United States Code,20 and they offer the states a choice of
affirmatively governing according to a specific set of federal
instructions or having their laws on the subject preempted. 21
Until now, federal statutes conditionally preempting state law
have been considered simpatico with the anti-commandeering
doctrine, as they do not legally compel the states to act.22 States that
dislike the federal government's specified terms can simply step aside
and do nothing, allowing the federal government to regulate the
subject itself. The Health Care Cases upend this understanding. The
fact that a federal statute offers the states the formal option of
stepping aside is no longer sufficient, in itself, to immunize that
statute from a commandeering challenge. If, as a practical matter,
states have no real choice but to govern on that subject, then
Congress's conditions amount to commands "in fact," and thus
violate the anti-commandeering doctrine.
How much might this matter? At this point it is unclear. Much
depends on how the Court defines the concept of "genuine choice," a
point left vague by the Health Care Cases. But no matter how this
standard is fleshed out, one place this new understanding could have
an immediate impact is in the field of state and local taxation.
19. See, e.g., Jonathan Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, The Line that Held: Why the
Commerce Clause Ruling Matters, NAT'L REV., July 30, 2012, at 14, 15 ("Given how often
Congress seeks to use the spending power, the Court's decision may open a new front in
the war to reinvigorate constitutional federalism, and occasion a reexamination of statutes
from No Child Left Behind to the Clean Air Act."); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The AntiLeveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB 3 (Aug. 2012) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
20. They include, for example, such prominent laws as the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (2006); the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1370
(2006); and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 667 (2006). See
New York, 505 U.S. at 167--68.
21. See New York, 505 U.S. at 167.
22. See id. ("[W]here Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the
Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress' power to offer States the choice of
regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by
federal regulation."); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764-65
(1982); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981).
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States and their political subdivisions impose all sorts of taxes
that affect interstate commerce, and the Supreme Court has long held
that the Commerce Clause grants Congress the authority to regulate
how these taxes are imposed.23 Like other federal statutes that do not
formally require the states to act, these statutes have never been
judged to violate the anti-commandeering principle-even when they
prescribe how particular state taxes are to be imposed-presumably
because they afford states the formal option of not imposing the
regulated tax at all. But states must raise revenue to exist. And
because they rely (to greater and lesser degrees) on the specific levies
they presently impose, the states may lack any practical choice but to
continue imposing them. (Indeed, the financial consequences to a
state in forgoing a particular tax could be more severe than
withdrawing from Medicaid.) Hence, federal laws specifying the
terms on which the states may implement such taxes, though not
formally requiring the states to impose them, may now constitute
impermissible commandeerings.
This would be unfortunate. The number, complexity, and
heterogeneity of state and local tax systems likely impose a number of
unnecessary costs on the American economy.24 And as the Court
itself has long recognized, Congress is better suited institutionally
than the judiciary, through its rather clumsy enforcement of the
dormant Commerce Clause, to address these complex problems.'
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides some
background concerning the relevant points of constitutional lawnamely, the precise metes and bounds of the anti-commandeering
principle. Next, Part II sets out the details of the Supreme Court's
Medicaid holding in the Health Care Cases. PartIII then explains how
this holding has effectively re-conceptualized the meaning of federal
commands to state governments, and thus extended the reach of the
anti-commandeering principle. Finally, Part IV presents the federal
23. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992); Moorman Mfg.
Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978); JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER
HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 4.24 (3d ed. 2010) ("Congress possesses unquestioned
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate state taxation of interstate commerce.");
infra Part IV.A.
24. See Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and PoliticalLook at Federalism in Taxation, 90
MICH. L. REv. 895, 898-930 (1992); infra Part IV.C.
25. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 637-38 (1981)
(White, J., concurring); Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 476
(1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176,
188-89 (1940) (Black, J., dissenting); JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER
HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 205-08 (8th ed.

2005).
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regulation of state and local taxes as a case study, illustrating how the
new meaning of commandeering may entail some troubling practical
consequences.
I. THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING PRINCIPLE (AND ITS LIMITS)

A.

The CentralIdea
It is well settled that Congress lacks the power to command the
states (or their political subdivisions) to govern their residents in a
particular fashion.2 6 As the Supreme Court has explained, any such
"commandeering" of state governments is "inconsistent with the
federal structure of our Government established by the
Constitution."27 Two decisions from the 1990s, New York v. United
289
States' and Printz
v. United States,9 cemented this principle into
constitutional doctrine (though arguably the rule predates those
decisions considerably)."o
In New York, the Court struck down the so-called "take title"
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
of 1985, which had directed the states either (a) to regulate low-level
radioactive waste "according to the instructions of Congress," or (b)
to accept title to all such waste generated within their borders (an
26. See Nat'I Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) (opinion of
Roberts, C.J.) (" '[T]he Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress
the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress' instructions.' " (quoting
New York, 505 U.S. at 162 (1992))); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 3.9 (3d ed. 2006); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 142 (17th ed. 2010); Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering
and Its Alternatives:A FederalismPerspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1642 (2006).
27. New York, 505 U.S. at 177.

28. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
29. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
30. See id. at 921-22; New York, 505 U.S. at 161-66; Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n
v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982) (upholding the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act ("PURPA") in part on the ground that there was "nothing in PURPA 'directly
compelling' the States to enact a legislative program"); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (holding that the challenged statute was
constitutional because there was "no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program"); see also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 513 (1988)
(concluding that the claim left open in FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission-"that the

Tenth Amendment might set some limits on Congress' power to compel States to regulate
on behalf of federal interests"-was not squarely presented); Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985) (declining to "identify or define what
affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the
States under the Commerce Clause"); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911)
(invalidating an act of Congress that, on condition of admission to the Union, dictated that
Oklahoma's state capital be located in a particular city for a specified period of years).
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enormous financial liability)."' The Court held that "[e]ither type of
federal action would 'commandeer' state governments into the
service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be
inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority between
federal and state governments." 3 2 Similarly, the Court in Printz
invalidated an interim provision of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act that directed state or local Chief Law Enforcement
Officers to conduct background checks on persons seeking to
purchase handguns. Summarizing its holding in plain terms, the
Court declared that the "Federal Government may neither issue
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor
command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions,
to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program."
Though important-perhaps even foundational-this anticommandeering principle is narrower than might first appear. There
are three important limits to its reach: (1) it only applies to federal
laws regulating the states in their sovereign capacities, as regulators
or governors of their inhabitants; (2) it only forbids federal laws that
require the states to take affirmative acts, not those merely
prohibiting state action; and (3) it does not forbid Congress from
enticing the states to regulate or govern in particular ways, even if
Congress could not command the states to do the same. The
remainder of this Part explains these limits in turn.
B.

States in Their Sovereign and ProprietaryCapacities
A critical limit on the anti-commandeering principle is that it
only forbids federal laws that dictate how a state regulates or
governs." It does not address the scores of federal laws that regulate
the states' behavior in other roles, such as when they act as
employers, proprietors, or polluters. 6 So-called "generally applicable
legislation"-like the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), which
imposes minimum-wage and maximum-hour requirements on all
employers in the United States of a certain size1 8-does not
31. See New York, 505 U.S. at 175-77.
32. Id. at 175.
33. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
34. Id.
35. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 26, at 142 (explaining that neither New
York nor Printz "questioned Congress's ability to regulate the states' own conduct under
general laws that also regulate the similar conduct of private actors").
36. See id.
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006 & Supp. 2011).
38. See id. §§ 203(d), 203(e)(2), 206-207.
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"commandeer" the states because it does not force them to
implement, administer, or enforce federal law." Rather, such
legislation merely requires state governments to conform their
behavior to a particular federal norm, a norm imposed on every entity
in the country engaged in that same activity. Statutes like the FLSA
treat the states as objects of federal regulation, not as tools for the
implementation of a federal legislative program. 40
The Supreme Court in 1985 upheld Congress's application of
such generally applicable laws (like the FLSA) to state governments
and their political subdivisions in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Agency.41 And when the Court later decided New York and
Printz, the Justices were careful to distinguish Garcia, thus preserving
its holding.42 Moreover, in 2000, the Court reaffirmed Congress's
authority to regulate the conduct of the states through generally
applicable legislation in Reno v. Condon,4 3 thus attesting to Garcia's
continuing vitality." As the Court explained in Condon, the
challenged federal statute (the Driver's Privacy Protection Act) was
constitutional because it "regulates the States as the owners of data
bases," not "in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own
citizens." 45
C.

Prohibitionsand Commands to Act
A second important limit on the anti-commandeering principle is
that it only forbids federal laws that command state governments to
take affirmative steps in regulating or governing their residents.4 6 It
does not extend to mere prohibitions-commands that states not
regulate in a particular fashion.4 7 This must be so, for otherwise the
39. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (concluding that, because the
challenged federal law did "not require the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate
their own citizens," but instead "regulate[d] the States as the owners of data bases," it was
"consistent with the constitutional principles enunciated in New York and Printz"); cf
Printz, 521 U.S. at 932; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
40. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 26, at 142.
41. See 469 U.S. 528, 555-56 (1985).
42. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 932; New York, 505 U.S. at 160-61; Matthew D. Adler &
Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yetsky, 1998
SuP. Cr. REV. 71, 110 (1998).
43. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
44. See id. at 151.
45. Id.
46. See Adler & Kreimer, supra note 42, at 89-95.
47. See id.; see also Brief for the Petitioners at 29, Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141
(2000) (No. 98-1464) ("The distinction between laws that impose affirmative obligations
on States and those that prevent States from taking action is well reflected in this Court's
preemption jurisprudence.").
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anti-commandeering principle would swallow up the doctrine of
preemption, a doctrine essentially dictated by the text of the
Constitution itself.
The Supremacy Clause of Article VI provides that
[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
Since the earliest days of the Republic, this language has been
understood as dictating that, when federal law and a state law
conflict, the state law-whether in the form of a state constitutional
provision, statute, administrative regulation, or common law rule of
liability-is inoperable.49 A federal statute that preempts state lawmost obviously, when it does so through an express preemption
clause-is, in essence, a command by Congress that the states not
regulate or govern in a particular way. Thus, if the anticommandeering principle and the doctrine of preemption are to
coexist, the former can only apply to directives requiring the states
affirmatively to act. Federal commands that states not regulate cannot
be a commandeering.
This distinction between prohibitions and mandates to take
affirmative acts may be somewhat artificial, especially at the edges."
As the lengthy debate as to whether the ACA's minimum coverage
provision regulates "activity" or "inactivity" illustrated, prohibitions

48. U.S. CONST. art. V.
49. See, e.g., M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819); see also
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) ("[Slince our decision in
[M'CullochJ, it has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is 'without
effect.' " (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981))).
50. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2622 (2012) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Siegel, supra note 26, at 1646 (distinguishing
preemption from commandeering, while noting that the former might actually interfere
more with a state's sovereign interests); Rachel F. Preiser, Note, Staking Out the Border
Between Commandeering and ConditionalPreemption: Is the Driver's Privacy Protection
Act ConstitutionalUnder the Tenth Amendment?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 514, 537 (1999) ("The
New York and Printz Courts recognized the constitutionality of federal preemption of
state law, thereby affirming the distinction between preemption and impermissible federal
commandeering of the states.").
51. See Archie v. Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1213 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) ("[1]t is
possible to restate most actions as corresponding inactions with the same effect . . . .").

822

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

can often be re-characterized as commands to act, and vice-versa. 5 2
Still, the action-inaction distinction is generally respected in law,5 and
it accurately captures the Court's various pronouncements of the anticommandeering principle in its opinions-pronouncements that
presumably were crafted with the implications for preemption
doctrine in mind. For instance, the Court stated in Condon that the
Driver's Privacy Protection Act-which regulates how states can
disseminate drivers' personal information collected by the states
through their departments of motor vehicles-does not commandeer
the states because "[i]t does not require the South Carolina
Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require
state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes
regulating private individuals."- Similarly, the Court in both New
York and Printz phrased the anti-commandeering principle as
prohibiting the federal government from "compel[ling] the States to
enact or administer a federal regulatory program."" As such, this
action-prohibition distinction sets an important boundary between
unconstitutional commandeerings and permissible regulations.
D. Commands, Enticements, and Coercion
A final limitation on the anti-commandeering principle-and the
one most immediately relevant in the Health Care Cases-is that,
though Congress cannot command the states to take affirmative steps
to govern in a particular fashion, nothing precludes Congress from
52. For instance, consider section 201(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
88-352, 78 Stat. 243, 243 (codified at 42 U.S.C § 2000a(a) (2006)). It provides that "[ajll
persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as
defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color,
religion, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2006). The Act further provides that all
hotels are "places of public accommodation." Id. § 2000a(b)(1). Does this provision
merely prohibit hotels from engaging in discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
or national origin? Or does it compel hoteliers into action, forcing them to let rooms to
persons whom they otherwise might not serve?
53. Indeed, it was critical to the Court's conclusion in the Health Care Cases that the
minimum coverage provision, because it regulated "inactivity," exceeded Congress's
authority to regulate interstate commerce. See Nat'l Fed'n. of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at
2589 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) ("To an economist, perhaps, there is no difference
between activity and inactivity .... But the distinction between doing something and
doing nothing would not have been lost on the Framers, who were 'practical statesmen,'
not metaphysical philosophers." (quoting Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am.
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 673 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring))).
54. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000).
55. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (quoting the same language from New York).
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encouraging the states to do the same through the enticement of
federal largesse. The first clause of Article I, Section 8 grants
Congress the authority to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
5. Congress can use this
general Welfare of the United States ..
spending power to offer funding to state governments on the
condition that they accept certain strings that come attached." To be
sure, the spending program must promote the "general welfare"; the
spending conditions must be germane to the purposes of the spending
program; the conditions must be unambiguous (so the states can fully
appreciate the obligations they are accepting); and the conditions
cannot induce the states to act unconstitutionally. 8 But assuming
these requirements are satisfied, nothing prevents Congress from
achieving indirectly (through conditional spending) what would
constitute an impermissible commandeering if directly compelled. As
the Court explained in New York, when Congress employs such a
"permissible method of encouraging a State to conform to federal
policy choices, the residents of the State retain the ultimate decision
as to whether or not the State will comply."5 9
Critical to the constitutionality of such conditional spending, of
course, is that the states' acceptance of the strings attached to the
federal dollars is voluntary. If the conditions were actually
commands, they would amount to a commandeering (assuming those
conditions required the states to take affirmative steps in their
sovereign capacities). A natural question, then, is whether the terms
imposed on the states' receipt of federal funds-funds to which the
states have no constitutional entitlement-can ever be so coercive as
to constitute compulsion.
Two Supreme Court decisions predating the Health Care Cases
suggested that they could. In the 1987 case of South Dakota v. Dole,6
the Court noted, "Our decisions have recognized that in some
circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be
so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into

56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
57. See, e.g., Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 686 (1999) ("Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its
grant of funds to the States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not
require them to take, and that acceptance of the funds entails an agreement to the
actions.").
58. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-11 (1987).
59. New York, 505 U.S. at 168.
60. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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compulsion.' "61 This sentence in Dole quoted the Court's 1937
decision in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,2 a case in which the Court
proffered a similar suggestion. Specifically, in upholding the federal
spending program at issue, the Steward Machine Court concluded that
"[n]othing in the case suggest[ed] the exertion of a power akin to
undue influence."63
Read in their entirety, though, Dole and Steward Machine are
enigmatic. Only five sentences after seeming to concede (in the
language quoted above) that spending conditions can be coercive, the
Dole Court threw some cold water on the idea:
[T]o hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is
to plunge the law in endless difficulties. The outcome of such a
doctrine is the acceptance of a philosophical determinism by
which choice becomes impossible. Till now the law has been
guided by a robust common sense which assumes the freedom
of the will as a working hypothesis in the solution of its
problems.'
This, too, was a direct quote from Steward Machine. And a closer
examination of Steward Machine reveals that the Court was really just
assuming arguendo the existence of a coercion doctrine. Here is the
relevant passage from Steward Machine in its entirety:
Nothing in the case suggests the exertion of a power akin to
undue influence, if we assume that such a concept can ever be
applied with fitness to the relations between state and nation.
Even on that assumption the location of the point at which
pressure turns into compulsion, and ceases to be inducement,
would be a question of degree,-at times, perhaps, of fact.6"
Thus, while Dole and Steward Machine were often cited for the
proposition that "Congress may not employ the spending power in
such a way as to 'coerce' the states into compliance with the federal
objective,"6 6 it was unclear, as of June 27, 2012, whether this was
61. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,590 (1937)).
62. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
63. Id. at 590.
64. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 589-90).
65. Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 590 (emphasis added).
66. Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1264 (11th Cir.
2011), rev'd, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); see also Van
Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639, 651-52 (8th Cir. 2009) ("[A]lthough the federal funding
amount involved here is not insubstantial, it does not render the statute unconstitutionally
coercive... ."); Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Educ., 512 F.3d 252, 277 n.2
(6th Cir. 2008) (noting that, when Congress uses its spending power to encourage the
states to take certain actions, "the financial incentives must not amount to coercion");
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actually a governing rule of constitutional law. The Supreme Court
had never invalidated a federal spending condition imposed on the
states as coercive.' Nor had any other court, at any level, in the
history of the United States.' The Health Care Cases changed things.
II. THE HEALTH CARE CASES
The Court's decision in the Health Care Cases was a big, big deal.
In sustaining the central provisions of the ACA, the Court placed its
imprimatur on a hugely important federal statute-one with the
potential to fundamentally alter the terms of the modern welfare
state.69 As important, the Chief Justice's opinion was arguably a
master stroke of judicial statesmanship, crossing ideological lines to
steer the Court clear of some treacherous political waters.70 To date,
most commentary has generally focused on the Court's upholding of
the individual mandate, the linchpin of the ACA's broader regulation
of the individual insurance market and the provision that, given its
centrality to the Act's regulatory scheme, threatened to bring down
Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 128 (4th Cir. 2006) ("[H]ard choices do not alone
amount to coercion."); Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 278-79 (5th Cir. 2005)
("[Tlhe Dole court recognized a fifth requirement [of conditions on federal funds] that the
condition not be coercive . . .. "); Nieves-Mdrquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 128 (1st
Cir. 2003) ("Under South Dakota v. Dole, ... the financial pressure created by the
conditional grant of federal funds must not rise to the level of compulsion.").
67. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("Prior to today's decision ... the Court has never ruled that the
terms of any grant crossed the indistinct line between temptation and coercion.").
68. See Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d at 1266 ("[OJur
review of the relevant case law indicates that no court has ever struck down a law such as
this one as unduly coercive.").
69. See Balkin, supra note 2; Fishkin, supra note 4.
70. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 87; Jeffrey Rosen, Big Chief. How to Understand
John Roberts, NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 2, 2012, at 13-14, available at http://www.tnr.com/
article/politics/magazine/104898/john-roberts-supreme-court-aca#; David L. Franklin, Why
Did Roberts Do It? To Save the Court., SLATE (June 28, 2012, 3:51 PM ET), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news and .politics/jurisprudence/2012/06/john-roberts brokewith
conservatives-to preserve the supremescourtsjlegitimacy.html; Bradley Joondeph, A
Marbury for Our Time, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2012, 2:36 PM), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2012/06/a-marbury-for-our-time/; Adam Winkler, The Roberts Court Is
Born, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2012, 12:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/theroberts-court-is-born/. But see David Bernstein, Rosen on Roberts as Statesman, THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 15, 2012, 10:12 PM), http://www.volokh.com/
2012/07/15/rosen-on-roberts-as-statesman/ (contending that "one thing seems pretty
certain: the way Roberts handled the case has not actually served the goal of enhancing
the Court's reputation of being 'above politics' "); Ilya Somin, The Impact of the
Individual Mandate Decision on the Supreme Court's Legitimacy, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (July 13, 2012, 12:57 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/13/the-impact-of(arguing that the
the-individual-mandate-decision-on-the-supreme-courts-legitimacy/
decision may have detracted from the Court's legitimacy more than it enhanced it).
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the entire ACA (if the Supreme Court found it both unconstitutional
and inseverable). 7 ' But the other important question the Court
decided-whether the ACA impermissibly coerced the states into
participating in the Act's massive expansion of the Medicaid
program-may actually prove more significant as a matter of
constitutional law.72
A.

The A CA's Expansion of Medicaid
Again, Medicaid is the joint federal-state spending program that
offers health insurance to the indigent and the disabled. States are not
required to participate in the program. But if they do, they must
abide by a variety of standards to qualify for the associated federal
funding (known as the "federal medical assistance percentage," or
"FMAP").7 4 The size of the FMAP varies by state, generally ranging
from fifty to eighty-three percent of the program's costs." Congress
originally enacted Medicaid in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social
Security Act, 6 and it is now the single largest federal aid program to
the states, accounting for forty-five percent of all federal grant-in-aid
to state governments. 77 It is the third largest domestic spending
71. See sources cited supra note 6.
72. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, No Respite for Liberals, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2012, at
SR7 ("That the individual mandate was upheld should not overshadow the court's ruling
on Medicaid expansion-the part of the ruling that is most likely to affect other legislation
in the near future."); Erin Ryan, Spending Power Bargaining After Sebelius 1 (SSRN
Working Paper No. 2119241, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2119241 ("[Tihe
most immediately significant portion of the ruling-and one with far more significance for
most regulatory governance-is the part of the decision limiting the federal spending
power that authorizes Medicaid."); Charles Fried, The June Surprises: Balls, Strikes, and
the Fog of War, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 2, 2012, 12:19 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2012/08/the-june-surprises-balls-strikes-and-the-fog-of-war/ ("But the Commerce Clause
activity/inactivity argument is so artificial and strained that at the end of the day it may not
be very constraining, easily gotten around by skillful drafting. The Medicaid expansion
invalidation, however, has potential for cutting a broad swath through many programs
hitherto seen as unassailable under the rubric of cooperative federalism."); Gillian
Metzger, Something for Everyone, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2012, 5:08 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/something-for-everyone/
("The Spending Clause
ruling portends greater import.").
73. See Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431,433 (2004); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301
(1980).
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006); Frew,540 U.S. at 433; Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496
U.S. 498, 502 (1990); Harris,448 U.S. at 301.
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (2006).
76. Social Security Amendments of 1965, § 121, Pub. L. No. 89-97,79 Stat. 286,343-52
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 to 1396w-5 (2006 & Supp. 2010)).
77. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID MATTERS:
UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID'S ROLE IN OUR HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 2 (2011),
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8165.pdf,

2013]

THE HEALTH CARE CASES

827

program (behind only Social Security and Medicare), providing
health coverage to nearly sixty million Americans and accounting for
eight percent of the federal budget." Medicaid's present role in the
states' finances is staggering: In fiscal year 2008, state governments
collectively spent 16.3% of their general fund dollars on Medicaid,
and the program accounted for 20.7% of state spending in total.?
Wholly aside from the ACA, federal law imposes numerous
requirements on states that participate in Medicaid (all of which
do).80 If a state fails to comply with these requirements,
the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] shall notify such
State agency that further payments will not be made to the
State (or, in his discretion, that payments will be limited to
categories under or parts of the State plan not affected by such
failure), until the Secretary is satisfied that there will no longer
be any such failure to comply.81
At the same time, federal law has always afforded states a fair degree
of flexibility in structuring their own distinct Medicaid programs.8
Historically, the states have retained discretion over matters such as
coverage eligibility levels, provider reimbursement rates, and (with
some limitations) the range of services covered.83
The ACA reduced this state-level discretion. Most importantly,
the Act imposed three new, related requirements: (1) states must
extend their coverage to non-disabled childless adults under the age
of sixty-five;' (2) they must, at a minimum, set their coverage
eligibility level at 133% of the federal poverty level (which, in
practice, translates to 138% of the federal poverty level);85 and (3)
78. Id. at 1-2.
79. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, HOPING FOR ECONOMIC
RECOVERY, PREPARING FOR HEALTH REFORM: A LOOK AT MEDICAID SPENDING,
COVERAGE AND POLICY TRENDS 11 fig.3 (2010), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/
8105.pdf.
80. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2006) (specifying a multitude of provisions that
a state plan for medical assistance must include).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006).
82. See Brief for Respondents (Medicaid) at 3-8, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400).
83. See Nat'lFed'nof Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
84. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2006)).
85. Section 2001(a)(1) of the ACA mandates that, beginning in 2014, states must
provide coverage to all individuals under the age of sixty-five (including childless adults)
with incomes under 133% of the federal poverty level. Id. Given the definition of modified
adjusted gross income dictated by section 1004 of the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act, this effectively means 138% of the federal poverty level. See Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1004(e), 124 Stat
1029, 1036; see also KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, EXPLAINING
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they must guarantee all covered individuals a so-called "benchmark"
benefits package.' Together, these provisions constitute a substantial
expansion of the program: participating states must provide
minimum, benchmark coverage to all their non-elderly residents with
incomes up to 138% of the federal poverty level.
Until now, Medicaid has never included non-disabled childless
adults. And presently the median state eligibility level is only 63% of
the federal poverty level." (Indeed, seventeen states have eligibility
cutoffs that are below half the federal poverty rate.") The ACA (if all
states participate) will thus increase enrollment in Medicaid by
somewhere between sixteen and twenty-three million individuals by
2019.89 The federal government will reimburse states for the bulk of
the costs attributable to this expansion, but it will not cover all of
them." As provided in section 1201 of the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act-the law enacted three days after the
ACA to amend some of its provisions-the United States will pay for
100% of these expenses from 2014 to 2016, 95% in 2017, 94% in 2018,
93% in 2019, and 90% thereafter.91
B.

The Supreme Court's Medicaid Holding
In their challenge to the ACA, the twenty-six state plaintiffs
claimed that their existing, pre-ACA Medicaid funding streams were
simply too massive for the states to have any real option of
withdrawing from the program.' The Act, they argued, "threatens
States with the loss of every penny of federal funding under the single
HEALTH REFORM: THE NEW RULES FOR DETERMINING INCOME UNDER MEDICAID IN

2014, at 2 n.2 (2011), www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8194.pdf ("In determining
eligibility, states will be required to reduce countable income by an amount equal to 5
percent of the poverty line, so the Medicaid income eligibility threshold effectively
becomes 138 percent of the federal poverty line.").
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(k)(1), 1396u-7(b)(5), 18022(b) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
87. See KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, PERFORMING UNDER
PRESSURE: ANNUAL FINDINGS OF A 50-STATE SURVEY OF ELIGIBILITY, ENROLLMENT,
RENEWAL, AND COST-SHARING POLICIES IN MEDICAID AND CHIP, 2011-2012, at 11

fig.11 (2012), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8272.pdf.
88. Id. at 11 fig.12.
89. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID COVERAGE
AND SPENDING IN HEALTH REFORM: NATIONAL AND STATE-BY-STATE RESULTS FOR

ADULTS AT OR BELOW 133% FPL 2-5 (2010), http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/
medicaid-coverage-and-spending-in-health-reform-national-and-state-by-state-results-foradults-at-or-below-133-fpl.pdf.
90. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)
(2006).
91. See id.
92. See Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid, supra note 10, at 23.
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largest grant-in-aid program in existence-literally billions of dollars
each year-if they do not capitulate to Congress' steep new
demands."93 To them, there was "no plausible argument that a State
could afford to turn down such a massive federal inducement,
particularly when doing so would mean assuming the full burden of
covering its neediest residents' medical costs.""
By a margin of seven to two, the Supreme Court agreed, though
no single opinion garnered five votes. Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito would have invalidated the ACA's Medicaid
expansion in toto. 5 Chief Justice Roberts's opinion, joined on this
point by Justices Breyer and Kagan, was less sweeping. It concluded
that the ACA's Medicaid expansion conditions were indeed coercive,
but only insofar as they operated as strings attached to the states'
existing Medicaid funding.' Because the Chief Justice's opinion
articulates the narrowest rationale for sustaining the Court's
Medicaid judgment, it is likely controlling on this point.'
The Chief Justice began his analysis by explaining that Congress
could certainly "condition the receipt of funds on the States'
complying with restrictions on the use of those funds, because that is
the means by which Congress ensures that the funds are spent
according to its view of the 'general Welfare.' "I Under the ACA,
though, the states' failure to comply with the new conditions did not
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2643 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ., dissenting).
96. See id. at 2607 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) ("What Congress is not free to do is to
penalize States that choose not to participate in that new program by taking away their
existing Medicaid funding.").
97. A technical application of the Court's own rules for discerning what is
"precedential" in a situation like this forbids combining the three votes of Roberts,
Breyer, and Kagan with the four votes of the dissenters, as these seven did not concur in
the same ultimate judgment. Cf Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When
a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
(quoting
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds .....
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
JJ.)). But the spirit of Marks certainly dictates that the Chief Justice's opinion, as the
narrowest ground for reaching the Court's ultimate result, should be viewed as controlling.
Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2601-08 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). Moreover, it is
worth noting that, no matter the differences between those joining the Chief Justice's
opinion and the joint dissenters on the Medicaid question, all seven of these justices
agreed on the point that I am exploring here: that a federal instruction to a state can
constitute a "command" when it leaves the state no practical choice "in fact." Id.; id. at
2656-68 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
98. Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2603-04 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
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just jeopardize the funds that the federal government was offering for
Medicaid expansion. Rather, the conditions took "the form of threats
to terminate other significant independent grants"-the states'
preexisting Medicaid dollars.99 Consequently, "the conditions are
properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy
changes.""c
Such pressuring, achieved through the tool of conditional
spending, is generally no more than "encouragement," and thus
perfectly constitutional.101 But in the ACA, explained Roberts, this
pressure crossed the line into compulsion. 0 2 The "financial
'inducement' Congress has chosen is much more than 'relatively mild
encouragement,' " but instead "a gun to the head." 0 Again, 42
U.S.C. § 1396c gives the Secretary the authority to terminate the
entirety of a state's federal Medicaid reimbursement if the state fails
to comply with any of the Act's requirements. Thus, a state choosing
not to expand its Medicaid coverage as prescribed by the ACA stood
"to lose not merely 'a relatively small percentage' of its existing
Medicaid funding, but all of it."" And the states' practical
dependence on the existing Medicaid program is undeniable. Not
only is the states' financial reliance on existing federal Medicaid
reimbursements enormous,105 but the states "have developed intricate
statutory and administrative regimes over the course of many decades
to implement their objectives under existing Medicaid."1'0 This
dependence, reasoned the Chief Justice, meant that Congress was
effectively leaving the states with no choice: "The threatened loss of
over 10 percent of a State's overall budget, in contrast [to the funds at
issue in Dole], is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no
real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.""
Importantly, reasoned Roberts, the Act's Medicaid expansion
did not simply constitute "a modification of the existing Medicaid
program."" Instead, it represented "a new program," a "shift in kind,
99. Id. at 2604.

100. Id.
101. Id. (noting that the Court in Dole had "found that the inducement was not
impermissibly coercive, because Congress was offering only 'relatively mild
encouragement to the States' ").
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. Id.

105. See id. ("Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average State's

total budget, with federal funds covering 50 to 83 percent of those costs.").
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2605.
108. Id.
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Under the ACA, "Medicaid is transformed

into a program to meet the health care needs of the entire nonelderly
population with income below 133 percent of the [federal] poverty
level.""o Rather than continuing as a "program to care for the
neediest among us," the ACA makes Medicaid "an element of a
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance
coverage.""' Indeed, Congress recognized this qualitative shift in its
structuring of the program's expansion; there is a separate funding
provision for those persons "newly eligible" for Medicaid, and the
federal reimbursement rate for these recipients differs from that for
those previously eligible."12 Moreover, the states could hardly have
anticipated such a significant change in Medicaid when they originally
agreed to participate in the program."' Though Congress expressly
reserved the "right to alter, amend, or repeal" any aspect of
Medicaid," 4 no state could have expected this reservation to include
"the power to transform [the program] so dramatically.""'
Thus, Congress was not merely amending the terms under which
states could spend dollars provided by the federal government.
Congress was effectively forcing the states to implement the ACA's
distinct Medicaid-expansion program by "threatening the funds for
the existing Medicaid program.""' Given the states' reliance on that
existing program, this threat was coercive."' Congress was effectively
commanding the states to govern according to Congress's
instructions." 8
This conclusion did not render the ACA's expansion of Medicaid
unconstitutional in its entirety, however. It only meant that Congress
could not "penalize States that choose not to participate in that new
program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.""' Hence,
forbidding the Secretary from applying § 1396c "to withdraw existing
Medicaid funds for failure to comply with the requirements set out in
the expansion" fully remedied the constitutional violation.120 The
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2606.

111. Id.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
See id.
42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006).
Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).

116. Id. at 2605.
117. See id. at 2608 ("As for the Medicaid expansion, that portion of the Affordable
Care Act violates the Constitution by threatening existing Medicaid funding.").
118. See id.
119. Id. at 2607.
120. Id.
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Court therefore validated Congress's authority to attach conditions to
the ACA's new funding: "Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress
from offering funds under the Affordable Care Act to expand the
availability of health care, and requiring that States accepting such
funds comply with the conditions on their use." 12 1
After the Health Care Cases, then, the states have a choice-or,
really, two choices. They can choose whether to continue
participating in the pre-ACA Medicaid program, according to the
conditions previously laid down by Congress; or they can choose
whether to participate in the Act's expansion of Medicaid, according
to the terms set out in the ACA. 22
III. THE NEW MEANING OF COMMANDS (AND COMMANDEERING)

The Court's decision in the Health Care Cases was the first in
United States history to invalidate a federal spending provision on the
ground that it coerced the states, and it immediately sent
constitutional lawyers scurrying to identify other programs that may
now be constitutionally suspect."' As others have explained, the
decision could mark a sea change in the scope of Congress's spending
power; significant aspects of major federal statutes, such as the Clean
Air Act or the No Child Left Behind Act, may now be
unconstitutional. 2 4 But the decision's implications do not stop there.
Properly understood, the new limits that the Health Care Cases
impose on Congress's spending authority are merely one
application-albeit an important one-of the ruling's underlying
rationale. What lies deeper in the opinion is a new approach to what
constitutes a federal "command" to the states. In fine, the Health
Care Cases re-conceptualized what qualifies as federal compulsion,
121. Id.
122. See Robert Pear, Uncertainty over States and Medicaid Expansion, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 2012, at A16; Where Each State Stands on ACA's Medicaid Expansion,
ADVISORY BD. CO. (July 17, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.advisory.com/Daily-Briefing/
2012/07/05/Where-each-state-stands-of-the-Medicaid-expansion
(finding that Texas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, and South Carolina "will not participate" in the Medicaid
expansion).
123. See Adler & Stewart, supra note 19, at 14-15; Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 47;
Nicole Huberfield, Starting to Work Beneath the Surface of the Medicaid Holding,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 29, 2012), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/
2
012/06/starting-to-work-beneath-the-surface-of-the-medicaid-holding.html
("Undoubtedly we will see future coercion cases, and not just in healthcare. While
Medicaid is one of the oldest conditional spending programs, it is one of many. Other
conditional spending programs include educational funding, transportation funding,
environmental protection laws, and welfare laws, just to name a few.").
124. See Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 48, 58.
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and in the process extended the reach of the anti-commandeering
doctrine.
To see this, it is important to deconstruct exactly why the Court
found the ACA's Medicaid provisions unconstitutional. The ultimate
constitutional problem was not simply that the Act exceeded
Congress's spending power; a federal statute can exceed Congress's
spending authority but nonetheless be constitutional if it fits within
one of Congress's other enumerated powers.125 Rather, the ultimate
constitutional problem was that the ACA commandeered the statesin the words of the Chief Justice, it " 'require[d] the States to govern
according to Congress' instructions.' "126 But the ACA did not
formally require the states to do anything with respect to Medicaid.
As a strictly legal matter, the states were free to walk away from the
program if they so desired." The Court nonetheless treated the
conditions that the ACA attached to the states' existing Medicaid
funds as obligations because, given the practical realities facing the
states, they had no "genuine" or "real choice" but to accept
Congress's conditions.128 The ACA only offered the states a choice
"in theory," not "in fact."
The critical move in the Court's analysis, then, was how it framed
the inquiry as to whether a federal law "commands" the states. At
bottom, the Health Care Cases rest on the premise that this inquiry
turns on more than legal form. Instead, the question is a practical one:
All things considered, do the states have a genuine choice and a real
option of rejecting the federal government's conditions? If the states
lack the practical ability to say no-if their choice is not genuinely
voluntary-the federal law's conditions must be viewed as commands.
And if those commands require the states to take affirmative acts in
their sovereign capacities, then the federal law violates the anticommandeering principle.
Again, the greatest practical significance of this new
conceptualization of commands lies in its application to federal-state
conditional spending programs, the precise context in which the
125. See Pierce Cnty. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 146-47 & n.9 (2003) (declining to resolve
whether a provision of the Highway Safety Act of 1966 was within Congress's spending
power, but nonetheless holding that it constituted a valid regulation under the Commerce
Clause).
126. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (quoting
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992)).
127. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents (Medicaid), supra note 82, at 17 ("Petitioners do
not dispute that they are free, as a matter of law, to turn down federal Medicaid funds if
they view program conditions as sufficiently contrary to their interests.").
128. Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604-05 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
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Health Care Cases arose. Because of the severe financial
consequences the states would suffer in withdrawing from various
federal grant-in-aid programs, several such programs may now be
vulnerable to constitutional challenges. But the deeper rationale of
the Court's holding extends further. It potentially applies to any
federal law in which two conditions hold: (1) the law presents the
states with a choice, and (2) one of the alternatives in that choice is
for the states to govern according to Congress's instructions. As such,
this new conception of "commands" applies as much to statutes
where the other choice-the alternative to governing as directed by
federal law-is for the states not to regulate (and have their laws
preempted) as it does to statutes where the other choice is to walk
away from federal largesse. The central question, in either context, is
whether the state's choice is genuinely voluntary. Just as the states
might lack a real option of withdrawing from a given federal spending
program, they might likewise lack the practical capacity to step aside
and not govern in a particular field. If so, federal laws previously
understood to be perfectly constitutional (as instances of federal
preemption) could now amount to impermissible commandeerings.
As an illustration, suppose Congress enacts a statute that forbids
the states from governing on the subject of X unless they do so
according to federal instructions A, B, and C. Prior to the Health Care
Cases, the statute would have been understood as simply prohibitory,
and hence constitutional. The statute does not formally command the
states to do anything, but merely preempts certain state laws (those
governing on the subject of X) that do not conform to a set of federal
norms (articulated in instructions A, B, and C). As explained in New
York, the Supreme Court has long "recognized Congress' power to
offer States the choice of regulating [an] activity according to federal
standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation." 229 If
a state's inhabitants "would prefer their government to devote its
attention and resources to problems other than those deemed
important by Congress, they may choose to have the Federal
Government rather than the State bear the expense of a federally
mandated regulatory program."" In other words, the states can
simply choose to step aside and do nothing at all.
The Health Care Cases disrupt this understanding. If the states
have no "genuine choice" but to govern on the subject of X-for
whatever set of practical reasons-then they lack any "real option" of
129. New York, 505 U.S. at 167.
130. Id. at 168.
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stepping aside and doing nothing. Instead, the federal statute is
effectively requiringthe states to act, and to act according to federal
instructions A, B, and C. The federal law "dragoons" the states into
governing according to Congress's directives."'
To be sure, the vast majority of federal statutes conditionally
preempting state law are almost certainly still constitutional, even
after the Health Care Cases, because they leave the states a legitimate
choice not to govern on Congress's terms. To pick just one example
(from hundreds), consider the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, which
directs states to "not establish, continue in effect, or enforce a law or
regulation establishing a recreational vessel or associated equipment
performance or other safety standard or imposing a requirement for
associated equipment ...

that is not identical to a regulation

prescribed" by the Coast Guard.'32 Whatever "genuine choice" might
mean, exactly, state governments surely have the practical capacity
not to regulate on the subjects of power boat safety already covered
by a Coast Guard regulation. No state could plausibly claim that the
Federal Boat Safety Act effectively compels it to enact regulations
identical to those prescribed by the federal government.
But many cases will not be so easy. Consider the following
hypothetical. Suppose that Congress generally would like to proscribe
the unsanitary disposal of liquid toxic waste-i.e., any disposal or
discharge of such waste posing a threat to human health or the
environment. But Congress has also concluded that, due to mounting
budget pressures, the cost of monitoring, investigating, and
prosecuting such conduct is simply too expensive for the federal
government to bear. Thus, Congress replaces existing federal laws on
the subject with a statute that offers the states the following choice:
(1) they can enact and enforce state-level legislation, which regulates
the disposal of liquid toxic waste in a manner dictated by Congress, or
(2) they can step aside and do nothing, in which case federal law will
completely preempt the field. Because of federal budget constraints,
though, the federal preemption of a given state's law will mean that
the disposal of liquid toxic waste will largely go unregulated in that
state. This non-regulation option is hardly what Congress prefers, but
Congress also believes that-given each state's incentives-it is very
unlikely to occur.

131. See Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) ("The
threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State's overall budget ... is economic dragooning
that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.").
132. 46 U.S.C. § 4306 (2006).
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The statute offers the states a choice "in theory." But as a
practical matter, state governments would likely find it impossible to
endure the unconstrained disposal of liquid toxic waste within their
borders, especially if the same conduct is tightly regulated in
surrounding states (making their jurisdictions a literal dumping
ground). Thus, the choice the federal law offers the states may not be
genuine; state governments may have no "real option" but to accede
to Congress's conditions and implement the prescribed federal
regulatory program. If so, the logic of the Health Care Cases dictates
that this hypothetical federal statute has commanded the states to act
affirmatively in regulating according to Congress's instructions, and is
thus an unconstitutional commandeering.
We can imagine other examples, but the broader point is this: the
Health Care Cases have changed the meaning of the anticommandeering principle. Because the inquiry as to whether a federal
law amounts to compulsion is now practical in nature, statutes
formally offering the states a choice may nonetheless be treated as
issuing the states commands. And if those commands require the
states to affirmatively govern in a particular fashion-whether framed
as conditions attached to federal funds, or as conditions precedent to
avoiding federal preemption-they amount to impermissible
commandeerings.
IV. A CASE STUDY: THE FEDERAL REGULATION
OF STATE TAXATION

Presently, it is unclear how much this new understanding of the
anti-commandeering doctrine will actually constrain Congress's
legislative authority. Much depends on how the Supreme Court
ultimately defines the concept of "genuine choice" (or "real choice"),
a matter the Health Care Cases left opaque.' 3 As the Chief Justice
wrote, "We have no need to fix a line" that defines "where persuasion
gives way to coercion.... It is enough for today that wherever that
line may be, this statute is surely beyond it.""
Whether Congress has left the states a choice "in fact," rather
than just "in theory," might turn largely on whether the financial
consequences are simply too large for a state realistically to reject
133. See Friedman,supra note 5 (stating after the Health Care Cases, "the line between
inducing state participation, which is legal, and coercing it, which is not, remains hard to
identify with precision"); Huberfield, supra note 123 ("The Court refused to define
coercion beyond assessing the Medicaid expansion as being 'beyond the line' where
'persuasion becomes coercion.' ").
134. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
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Congress's conditions. (This was certainly one of the chief problems
with the ACA's Medicaid provisions."') Or it might depend, at least
in part, on whether the states have already invested substantially in
the administration and implementation of the affected programwhether they "have developed intricate statutory and administrative
regimes over the course of many decades to implement their
objectives."'3 6 (This, too, was a problem with the ACA cited in the
Health Care Cases.'37 ) Or it could hinge to some degree on whether
the subject at issue is central to a state's status as an independent
sovereign, a factor the Court has considered in resolving several other
questions of constitutional federalism."
In all events, there is at least one area where the new meaning of
commandeering seems likely to apply-where the financial
consequences for the states are potentially enormous, where the
states have developed intricate statutory and administrative regimes
over the course of many decades, and where the subject matter is core
to the states' sovereignty. And that is the field of state and local
taxation.
State and Local Taxation in the United States
At this point, a brief primer on state and local taxes is in order.
State and local governments impose a wide variety of taxes, all of
which have some impact on interstate commerce. As of 2008 (the
latest year for which the relevant data are available), the most
significant subnational taxes were those imposed on sales and gross
receipts ($449 billion), property ($410 billion), personal income ($305

A.

135. See id. at 2605 ("The threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State's overall budget
... is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in
the Medicaid expansion.").
136. Id. at 2604.
137. See id.
138. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (holding that the civil
remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act exceeded Congress's commerce
power in part because "[t]he regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not
directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has
always been the province of the States"); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995)
(invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act in part because it intruded on "areas such as
criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign");
Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 833 (1976) (holding that Congress lacked the
authority to regulate the conduct of state governments "in areas of traditional
governmental functions"); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)
(stating that, when Congress legislates "in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied," the Court "start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress").
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billion), and corporate income ($58 billion). 139 All told, state and local
governments collected more than $1.3 trillion in tax revenue in 2008,
accounting for more than one third of the tax burden in the United
States.1
Given our federal structure, states have an inherent incentive to
minimize the tax burden borne by their own residents while, at the
same time, maximizing their collection of revenue. Thus, states are
constantly devising tax schemes that, in one way or another, burden
or discriminate against interstate commerce. 4' Historically, our
constitutional system's principal means for policing this parochial
behavior has been through the judiciary's enforcement of the
dormant Commerce Clause-a negative inference the Supreme Court
has long drawn from the Constitution's affirmative grant of authority
to Congress to regulate interstate commerce, and which generally
forbids the states from discriminating against or unduly burdening
interstate commerce. 142 Going back to its 1852 decision in Cooley v.
Board of Wardens,143 the Court has invoked the Commerce Clause to
invalidate state or local laws that interfere with the creation of a
common national market, free from state or local trade barriers.'"
Significantly, the Court has used the dormant Commerce Clause
specifically to invalidate state or local tax measures since at least
1872.145

The Court's application of the dormant Commerce Clause to
state and local taxes has hardly followed a steady path. As the
Justices observed a half-century ago, despite having by then "handed
down some three hundred full-dress opinions" on the subject, their
decisions

"have

been

'not

always

clear[,]

...

consistent

or

139. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 273 tbl. 435 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/
compendia/statab2012/tables/12s0435.pdf.
140. Id.
141. See Shaviro,supranote 24, at 911.
142. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997) ("The negative or
dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation ... that
discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce...
143. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299,318 (1852).
144. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 25, at 194; 1 LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-2, at 1030 (3d ed. 2000).
145. See Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 232 (1872); see also
HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 23,
4.08, at 4-31 ("The Case of the State
Freight Tax first unequivocally announced and squarely applied the doctrine that the
Commerce Clause by its own force limits state tax power over interstate commerce.").
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reconcilable.' "146 Still, the basic thrust has always been to protect
interstate commerce from taxes that operate to protect or advantage
in-state economic interests.147 Presently, the Court applies a four-part
test first fully articulated in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.'4 8
Under this Complete Auto test, a state or local tax imposed on
interstate commerce "will not survive Commerce Clause scrutiny if
the taxpayer demonstrates that the tax (1) applies to an activity
lacking a substantial nexus to the taxing State; (2) is not fairly
apportioned; (3) discriminates against interstate commerce; or (4) is
not fairly related to the services provided by the State." 49 The Court
has used these criteria to invalidate scores of state or local taxes. 0
Importantly, though, the federal judiciary is not the only national
institution involved in protecting interstate commerce from
overweening state and local taxation. At least since the 1950s,
Congress has also played a role, enacting a number of statutes
regulating how state and local governments impose specific levies.
For example, Public Law 86-272 provides that "[n]o State, or political
subdivision thereof, shall have power to impose ... a net income tax
on the income derived within such State" when the taxpayer limits its
activities in that state to "the solicitation of orders . . . for sales of

tangible personal property."' 5 ' The Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act forbids states from imposing any tax "that
146. Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1959)
(second alteration in original) (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344
(1957)).
147. See generally Donald Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986) (arguing that, as a
general matter, the Court's dormant Commerce Clause decisions are best understood as
prohibiting state or local governments from engaging in purposeful economic
protectionism).
148. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
149. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1994)
(emphasis added).
150. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 183 (1995);
Barclays, 512 U.S. at 310-11 (1994); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992);
Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 372 (1991); Amerada Hess Corp.
v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, N.J. Dep't of Treasury, 490 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1989); D.H. Holmes
Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 30 (1988); Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S.
266, 291 (1987); Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 8 (1986);
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 754 (1981); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445
U.S. 425, 443 (1980); Dep't of Revenue v. Ass'n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734,
745-46 (1978); see also Walter Hellerstein, Michael J. McIntyre & Richard D. Pomp,
Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation After Jefferson Lines, 51 TAX L. REv. 47,
49 & n.13 (1995).
151. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, § 101, 73 Stat. 555, 555 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 381 (2006)).
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discriminates against a rail carrier,"1 12 and subsequent amendments
forbid similar discrimination against motor carriers15 or air carriers.154
And the Internet Tax Freedom Act states that "[n]o State or political
subdivision thereof may impose any ... [tiaxes on Internet access" or
"[m]ultiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce. "155
The Supreme Court has long held that the Commerce Clause
grants Congress the authority to enact these sorts of statutesstatutes regulating how states and their political subdivisions tax
persons or entities engaged in interstate commerce. Consider the
Court's 1978 decision in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair.' 6 At
issue was Iowa's method of apportioning the income of multistate
businesses for purposes of the state's corporate income tax.' 7 Unlike
other states, Iowa computed a taxpayer's income attributable to Iowa
based entirely on the proportion of the taxpayer's sales to Iowa
customers. 5 8 Given other states' use of multi-factor apportionment
formulas, the practical effect of Iowa's scheme was to subject many
out-of-state corporations to state-level taxation on more than one
hundred percent of their income.'5 9 It also created a financial
incentive for out-of-state businesses to locate their property and jobs
in Iowa.160
Nonetheless, the Court rejected the taxpayers' challenge to
Iowa's scheme.' 6' The Justices did not deny that Iowa's single-factor
sales apportionment scheme effectively produced multiple taxation,
or that this multiple taxation potentially discriminated against
interstate commerce. Rather, the Court explained that, whatever the
substantive merits of the out-of-state businesses' complaint, Congress
was the institution to solve the problem:
It is clear that the legislative power granted to Congress by the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution would amply justify the
enactment of legislation requiring all States to adhere to
uniform rules for the division of income. It is to that body, and

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)(4) (2006).
Id. § 14502.
Id. § 40116.
47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
437 U.S. 267 (1978).
Id. at 269.
See id. at 269-70.
See id. at 284-86 & n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See id. at 289.
See id. at 271-81 (majority opinion).
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not this Court, that the Constitution has committed such policy
decisions.162
Or, consider the Court's 1992 decision in Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota.'3 The question there was whether North Dakota could
require out-of-state sellers lacking any "physical presence" in the
state to collect use taxes on sales to North Dakota customers."
Critically, the Court had held twenty-five years earlier, in National
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Departmentof Revenue,'" that the imposition of a
was
circumstances
these
under
obligation
collection
6
6
to
the
Hess
Bellas
unconstitutional.' In Quill, the Court overruled
extent it had relied on principles of due process, but it retained Bellas
Hess's physical presence requirement under the dormant Commerce
Clause."' As in Moorman, the Court explained that Congress was the
appropriate institution to balance the relevant considerations: "[T]he
underlying issue is not only one that Congress may be better qualified
to resolve, but also one that Congress has the ultimate power to
resolve. No matter how we evaluate the burdens that use taxes
impose on interstate commerce, Congress remains free to disagree
with our conclusions. "168
There are several other examples, but the basic point is clear. As
the leading treatise in the field sums up, "Congress possesses
unquestioned power under the Commerce Clause to regulate state
taxation of interstate commerce. "169
B. Applying the New Understanding
The Supreme Court has never explicitly discussed how federal
statutes that regulate state and local taxation are compatible with the
anti-commandeering principle. But synthesizing these two doctrines is
relatively straightforward-or at least it was before the Health Care
Cases.

162. Id. at 280. Congress, though, has yet to take up in the invitation.
163. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
164. See id. at 301.
165. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
166. Id. at 758.
167. See Quill,504 U.S. at 306-20.
168. Id. at 318.
169. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 23, [ 4.24; see also Arthur R. Rosen &
Jeffrey S. Reed, The Final Word: Congressand the Express Commerce Clause, 2007 ST. &
LOC. TAX LAW. 9, 22 ("A strong line of cases clearly demonstrates that Congress has the
power to regulate state taxation."); Shaviro, supra note 24, at 986 (stating that Congress's
power to restrict state and location taxation of interstate commerce is plenary).
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Again, none of these federal statutes, in express terms, requires a
state or local government to impose a given tax. Instead, they
effectively take the form of prohibitions. Some are flat prohibitions,
and thus should be unaffected by the Health Care Cases. For instance,
the State Taxation of Pension Income Act of 1995 provides that "[n]o
State may impose an income tax on any retirement income of an
individual who is not a resident or domiciliary of such State (as
determined under the laws of such State).""o But other federal
statutes operate as conditional prohibitions; they give states a choice
between (1) taxing according to Congress's terms, or (2) having their
tax schemes preempted. Consider the Mobile Telecommunications
Sourcing Act ("MTSA"). 171 It provides, in relevant part, that,
"[n]otwithstanding the law of any State or political subdivision of any
State, mobile telecommunications services provided in a taxing
jurisdiction to a customer, the charges for which are billed by or for
the customer's home service provider, shall be deemed to be provided
by the customer's home service provider."1 7 2 The MTSA does not
force the states to tax mobile communications. But if they choose to
do so, they must affirmatively implement the specific sourcing rules
prescribed by Congress.
Before the Health Care Cases, all federal statutes regulating state
and local taxation-whether taking the form of a flat prohibition or a
conditioned choice-could be conceptualized as forms of preemption.
They effectively nullify (or preempt) state or local taxes failing to
conform to a particular federal norm. As with federal laws
preempting other forms of state regulation, those regulating state and
local taxation always afford state and local governments the formal
option to step aside and do nothing at all. A state that does not like
the MTSA's sourcing rules, for instance, can decide not to tax mobile
telecommunication services. In this way, Congress has not
commanded the states to take any affirmative acts, and the federal
statutes would not be understood as commandeerings.
As should now be clear, the Health Care Cases upend this
understanding, at least with respect to federal statutes taking the form
of conditional prohibitions. To repeat, the ratio decidendi of the
Court's Medicaid holding is that any federal law regulating the
conduct of the states that does not offer the states a genuine choice
but to comply with Congress's conditions must be understood as a
170. 4 U.S.C. § 114 (2006).
171. Pub. L. No. 106-252, § 116, 114 Stat. 626, 626-27 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 116-126 (2006)).
172. 4 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2006).
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federal command. This means that, if Congress conditionally
preempts a state tax by prescribing the terms on which that tax must
be imposed (lest it be preempted)-and the state practically has "no
option" but to continue imposing that tax-the federal law will
constitute a commandeering.
Consider, for example, a federal statute regulating the states'
division of income for purposes of business activity taxes (such as
corporate income taxes), precisely the type of law contemplated by
the Court in Moorman. Such a statute would generally consist of the
following: (1) a prescription of uniform rules for the apportionment
of business income (i.e., income earned in the ordinary operation of
the enterprise); (2) definitions of the factors-such as sales, property,
and payroll-that form the prescribed formula; and (3) a set of rules
for allocating businesses' non-business income (i.e., non-operational,
investment income). 17 3 Now assume, reasonably enough, that several
states depend heavily on their business activity tax revenue-perhaps
that this revenue (much like federal Medicaid reimbursements)
constitutes close to ten percent of their annual budgets. The logic of
the Health Care Cases dictates that the states may have no "genuine
choice" but to continue imposing their business activity taxes. As a
result, Congress's prescriptions as to how states are to apportion
business income, define the relevant apportionment factors, and
allocate non-business income would all constitute federal
commands-commands forcing states to act affirmatively in their
sovereign capacities. As such, the precise sort of federal law endorsed
by the Court in Moorman would constitute a commandeering.
Or suppose Congress enacted a statute similar to that
contemplated by the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement
("SSUTA"),'7 4 a plan collectively developed over the past decade by
state tax administrators and other stakeholders.'7 5 Such a law would
require states imposing sales and use taxes to implement and enforce
a variety of provisions, such as (1) greater uniformity in the applicable
tax rate;17 6 (2) state-level uniformity in the tax base;177 (3) uniform
173. Cf Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 278-79 (1978) (discussing the various
details such a hypothetical statute would need to address in order to prevent multiple
taxation).
174. STREAMLINED SALES & USE TAX AGREEMENT (amended May 24, 2012),
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/uploads/downloads/Archive/SSUTA/SSUTA%20As%
20Amended%205-24-12.pdf.
175. See John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus
Standardfor the Twenty-First Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 371-72 (2003).
176. STREAMLINED SALES & USE TAX AGREEMENT, supra note 174, § 308.
177. See id. § 302.
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rules for determining where covered transactions occur;"' and (4)
uniform definitions of items commonly exempted from sales taxes
(such as groceries and medical supplies).'7 9 Again, many states that
currently impose sales and use taxes might well find it practically
impossible to forego the revenue those taxes generate. As a result, a
federal law requiring the states to conform their sales tax schemes to
the basic provisions of the SSUTA would, under the rationale of the
Health Care Cases, amount to a command. Because that command
would force the states to affirmatively govern according to Congress's
instructions, it would amount to a commandeering.
These are just two possibilities. The larger point is that,
whenever a state depends significantly on the revenue a given tax
generates, a federal law prescribing the terms on which that tax can
be implemented is now constitutionally suspect. The federal statute
must afford the states a true choice, not just "in theory" but "in fact."
C.

Taxation and Governance
Conceivably, one might argue that taxing is not really governing,
such that federal laws dictating how states are to implement their tax
schemes fall outside the ambit of the anti-commandeering principle.
But that seems implausible.
First, the essence of the constitutional prohibition on
commandeering-the precise reason commandeerings violate the
structural principles of federalism, according to the Court-is that
Congress lacks the authority to direct state governments how to
affirmatively exercise their sovereign powers over their own
citizens.'" Taxing is no less essential an aspect of a sovereign's
authority than regulating or spending. In the Court's own words,
"[tlhe power of a state to tax" is "basic to its sovereignty,"' 8 1 an
authority that is "fundamental and delicate."" Thus, the choices a
state makes with respect to its tax system would seem just as central
to public governance as those concerning its regulatory or social
welfare programs.

178. See id. §§ 309-315.
179. See id. § 316.
180. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) ("As an initial matter,
Congress may not simply 'commandeefr] the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.' " (quoting Hodel v.
Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981))).
181. Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583, 585 (1953).
182. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990).
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Second, the Court has articulated two basic rationales for the
anti-commandeering principle: (1) the Framers of the Constitution
quite deliberately chose to confer on Congress the authority to
govern the people directly, rather than through the machinery of the
states (a system that had proved unworkable under the Articles of
Confederation);8 3 and (2) state laws or executive actions that are
dictated by Congress blur the relevant lines of political accountability,
leaving citizens unable to discern which elected officials are
responsible for a given policy." These underlying rationales apply
with just as much force to federal mandates that compel the states to
tax in certain ways as they do to laws that dictate specific forms of
regulation or spending. Thus, if implementing a spending program
that provides health insurance to the indigent and disabled qualifies
as governing under the anti-commandeering doctrine-as the Court
concluded in the Health Care Cases-so should the imposition of
taxes. Indeed, a state's prerogative to determine how it will generate
revenue arguably falls even closer to the core of its sovereignty than
the discretion to decide how to distribute a benefit like health
coverage, especially when more than half the funding for that benefit
comes from the federal government.
D. Some PracticalConsequences
The example of federal statutes that regulate state and local
taxation serves not just to illustrate how the Health Care Cases have
altered the contours of the anti-commandeering principle. It also
reveals an unfortunate (and likely unintended) consequence of the
Court's decision: it may seriously fetter Congress's authority to
address the many problems plaguing the nation's state and local tax
system. And as the Court itself has often acknowledged, Congress is
much better situated than the judiciary to devise solutions to these
complex problems.
Complications of measurement make it impossible to know for
certain, but it is likely that state and local tax schemes impose billions
of dollars in needless costs on the United States economy. Consider
the following four pathologies, all of which are largely endemic to our
federal structure.

183. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161-67.
184. See id. at 168-69.
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1. Disadvantaging Interstate Commerce
State governments have an inherent political incentive to design
their tax systems to provide competitive advantages to in-state
taxpayers and to maximize the economic incidence of their taxes on
out-of-state taxpayers. Of course, the judicial enforcement of the
dormant Commerce Clause can stymie blatant forms of such
discrimination.
But
subtler
practices-the
single-factor
apportionment of business income at issue in Moorman, for example,
or the common game of imposing higher sales tax rates on hotels and
rental cars"'-routinely disadvantage commerce that crosses state
lines. This tax favoritism is inefficient; it reduces the aggregate social
gains from trade by favoring higher-cost, local businesses at the
expense of more efficient, out-of-state firms.
2. Locational Distortions
Relatedly, state tax schemes (again, like the single-factor
apportionment formula at issue in Moorman) tend to distort
taxpayers' locational decisions, inducing firms to locate their facilities
and jobs in particular jurisdictions. This, too, results in deadweight
loss, as it induces behavior not because of its underlying economic
sense but purely due to its tax consequences. Of course, many of
these locational distortions are unavoidable, given that states have
broad discretion to pursue differing tax policies. But federal
legislation can constrain that discretion in constructive ways, and
thereby reduce the size of these distortions.
3. Undertaxation and the Underproduction of Public Goods
Presently, state and local governments have a strong incentive to
compete with one another for mobile taxpayers-specifically,
business enterprises and affluent individuals. Under the right
conditions, this competition can be healthy for the economy. But
because the states are generally incapable of coordinating their tax
policies, they cannot bind each other to any ground rules to govern
their tax competition. This collective action problem can create a sort

185. See, e.g., Logan E. Gans, Take Me out to the Baligame, but Should the Crowd's
Taxes Pay for It?, 29 VA. TAX REV. 751, 767 (2010) (discussing the phenomenon in

connection with the public financing of sports stadiums); Jack F. Williams, Jessica O'Quin
& Joshua Stein, Public Financing of Green Cathedrals, 5 ALB. Gov'T L. REV. 123, 135

(2012) (same).
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of prisoner's dilemma, 8 6 in which the states are apt to tax mobile
taxpayers more lightly than they sincerely prefer.' 7 As a result, the
states may well collect a less-than-optimal amount of revenue, and
consequently produce a suboptimal level of public goods (such as
education, health care, and police protection).
4. Planning and Compliance Costs
Finally, non-uniform state and local taxes-the varying schemes,
rules, and definitions splayed out across more than 7,500 distinct
*-force taxpayers to devote substantial
taxing jurisdictions' M
and compliance.'8 9 The present level of nontax
planning
resources to
uniformity requires taxpayers to maintain a working knowledge of
hundreds of different tax regimes; engage in multiple, overlapping
calculations of their liabilities; maintain separate sets of records
(given the varying definitions of salient tax attributes, such as basis);
and file hundreds (if not thousands) of different forms.19 0 It also
encourages taxpayers to engage the assistance of lawyers,
accountants, and consultants to devise sophisticated tax minimization
strategies. To be sure, every tax system entails planning and
compliance costs. But the number and heterogeneity of taxing
jurisdictions in the United States increases those costs exponentially.

In short, the negative wealth effects attributable to the state and
local tax system-caused by the states' strategic behavior, state-level
collective action problems, and the non-uniformity of state and local
tax regimes-are likely substantial. It is therefore unsurprising that
Congress has considered several measures to regulate state and local
taxes in recent years. Proposed legislation includes the Business
Activity Tax Simplification Act, which would clarify when states have
jurisdiction to impose income taxes on out-of-state firms;191 the
186. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME
THEORY AND THE LAW 33 (1994) (explaining the basic mechanics of the collective action
problem commonly referred to as a prisoner's dilemma).
187. See William F. Fox & John A. Swain, The Federal Role in State Taxation: A
Normative Approach, 60 NAT'L TAX J. 611, 615 (2007).
188. See Sales Tax Fairness and Simplification Act: Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,110th Cong.
11 (2007) (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Member, H. Subcomm. On Commercial and
Admin. Law).
189. See Shaviro, supra note 24, at 919-27.
190. See id.
191. H.R. 1083, 111th Cong. (2009).
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Mobile Workforce State Income Tax Fairness and Simplification Act,
which would specify rules governing state jurisdiction to tax the
income of individuals performing services in more than one state;"
the Telecommuter Tax Fairness Act, which would define the
circumstances under which a state could tax the income of an
individual whose professional office address is located in the taxing
state, but who performs her work at home in another state; 93 and the
Sales Tax Fairness and Simplification Act, which would grant
Congress's consent to the terms of the SSUTA.194
The logic of the Health Care Cases, however, means that some of
these proposals may be unconstitutional. Indeed, by expanding the
breadth of the anti-commandeering principle, the Court may have
disempowered Congress from enacting any legislation prescribing the
terms on which states can implement taxes on which they currently
rely heavily. This could be quite unfortunate, for as the Justices have
frequently acknowledged, Congress is much better suited than the
courts to address these complicated problems of tax policy.' As
Justice Black cogently observed more than sixty years ago in
McCarrollv. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc.,"
Congress alone can, in the exercise of its plenary constitutional
control over interstate commerce, not only consider whether
such a tax as now under scrutiny is consistent with the best
interests of our national economy, but can also on the basis of
full exploration of the many aspects of a complicated problem
devise a national policy fair alike to the States and our Union.197
To be sure, Congress's solutions will not be perfect. But as a
matter of comparative institutional competence, Congress is better
positioned than the judiciary to devise detailed, prospective rules that
are tailored to the intricacies of state and local taxation.
192. H.R. 2110, 111th Cong. (2009).
193. H.R. 2600, 111th Cong. (2009).
194. H.R. 3396, 110th Cong. (2007).
195. Indeed, unless Congress repeals the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006),
which precludes lower federal court jurisdiction over most state tax disputes, the Supreme
Court could be the only national institution capable of engaging in this endeavor.
196. 309 U.S. 176 (1940).
197. Id. at 189 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,
453 U.S. 609, 637-38 (1981) (White, J., concurring) (stating that Congress has the power to
regulate state taxation so as to protect from burdens on interstate commerce); Nw. States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 476 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
("Congress alone can provide for a full and thorough canvassing of the multitudinous and
intricate factors which compose the problem of the taxing freedom of the States and the
needed limits on such state taxing power.").
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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in the Health Care Cases was
hugely important, and its consequences are likely to reverberate for
years. One of those consequences is that the Court effectively reconceptualized what constitutes a federal command to the states.
Regardless of the legislative authority Congress has invoked, a
federal law leaving the states no "genuine choice" but to accede to
Congress's conditions must now be understood as a command. And if
that command requires the states to act affirmatively in their
sovereign capacities, it amounts to an unconstitutional
commandeering.
It is unclear how many federal laws might be jeopardized by this
new conceptualization. The answer largely depends on the sorts of
practical circumstances leading the Court to conclude that the states
lack a "legitimate choice" or "real option." But one place this new
understanding will plainly matter is in assessing the constitutionality
of federal laws that regulate state and local taxation. If a state relies
heavily on a particular tax, the Health Care Cases suggest that a
federal statute prescribing the manner in which that tax is to be
imposed must be understood as a command, and thus a
commandeering.
There is some irony here. Several commentators have criticized
the Court's decision for unjustifiably expanding the government's
authority to tax, pointing to the opinion's broad construction of
Congress's taxing power in sustaining the ACA's minimum coverage
provision."'s These critics may be right, but perhaps not for the reason
they have supposed. The more acute tax problem created by the
Court's holding may instead involve those levies imposed by state and

198. See, e.g., John Yoo, Chief Justice Roberts and His Apologists, WALL ST. J., June
30, 2012, at A15; Robert Alt, Twisting a Statute Is Better than Twisting the
Constitution,SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2012, 6:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2012/06/twisting-a-statute-is-better-than-twisting-the-constitution/; Epstein, supra note 6;
Rick Hills, The Healthcare Decision and the Revival of the Taxing Power: The Costs and
Benefits of Formalism in Federalism, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 28, 2012, 11:03 AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/06/the-healthcare-decision-and-the-costsNeily, Unintended
Clark
and-benefits-of-formalism-in-federalism.html#more;
Consequences, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2012, 9:54 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/
06/unintended-consequences/; Paulsen, supra note 6; Ilya Somin, A Taxing, but Potentially
Hopeful Decision, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2012, 6:13 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2012/06/a-taxing-but-potentially-hopeful-decision/; Ilya Somin, An Unpersuasive Majority
Ruling on Obamacare, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 28, 2012, 2:39 PM), http://
www.nydailynews.com/opinion/unpersuasive-majority-ruling-obamacare-article1.1104052?print.
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local governments, levies that Congress may have difficulty regulating
under the Court's new conception of commandeering.

